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Understanding learning and discovering to what extent it can be automated is one of the major
problems in computer science. This is of obvious relevance when trying to create intelligent robots,
for example, and fields as diverse as biology and economics use learning algorithms to help manage
and understand their extremely large data sets. There has even been work devoted to analyzing
computational learning systems in order to gain intuition about natural learning systems: authors
of a ’60s textbook on learning machines called perceptrons give voice to their hope that among
their readership are “psychologists and biologists who would like to know how the brain computes
thoughts” [MP69]. More recently, we have seen the development of a mathematical model for
analyzing evolution as a learning process [Val09].
One major approach taken to analyzing learning has been to look at classification problems. As an
example of such a problem, consider the scenario of teaching a computer to tell when an image has
a bird in it. Say you go about doing this by showing the computer a ton of pictures and telling it
which ones have birds in them. After giving it some time to compute, you might hope that it can
now figure out whether or not images that it hasn’t seen before have birds in them. But how can
you be sure that this is a fruitful way of teaching image recognition?
Computational learning theory attempts to answer this question in a mathematically rigorous way
by formalizing these classification scenarios in models that define exactly the interaction between
the learner and what it’s trying to learn and give a metric for evaluating the learner’s success. When
learning is so formalized in models, we can begin to answer natural questions about learning, such
as to what extent does asking questions help. Two of these models that we will focus on here are
Leslie Valiant’s Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model of learning and Dana Angluin’s exact
learning model.
Researchers have carefully studied the issue of whether giving the learner the ability to ask ques-
tions (or to pose membership queries, in learning theory terminology) improves its ability to learn,
and the answer is dependent on the learning model under consideration. In the agnostic learning
model, for instance, a learner which works with membership queries can be converted to one which
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works without membership queries, although in the distribution-specific agnostic setting member-
ship queries do increase the power of the learner [Fel09]. In both the PAC model and the exact
learning model, on the other hand, it has been shown that there are some concepts that can be
learned with membership queries but cannot be learned without. A well known example of such a
class is the class of deterministic finite automatas (DFAs), which were shown to be learnable with
membership queries in [Ang87] but not learnable without membership queries in [KV94] given
suitable assumptions.
Another major development of computer science has been that of modern cryptography. Starting
from certain basic and currently unavoidable assumptions, powerful cryptographic protocols have
been developed which multiple consenting parties can use to engage in secure communication, which
has a wide variety of uses, including electronic commerce. A major part of the cryptographic
research effort has been to further understand the assumptions that form the foundation of these
cryptographic protocols, with one eventual aim being perhaps to construct cryptographic protocols
that do not require any assumptions. An example of a protocol that will be used in this paper is
the signature scheme, which allows a user to sign any message they send so that whoever receives it
knows who sent it.
The link between cryptography and learning theory was recognized very early on. The very first
paper on PAC learning rules out learning polynomial-size circuits given cryptographic assumptions
[Val84]. At a high level, a cryptographic protocol proven to be secure has a guarantee attached to it
which prevents a malicious user from breaking the security, no matter how well that user may learn.
So provably-secure cryptography bounds the ability to learn.
One such link was shown by Angluin and Kharitonov in [AK95]. They showed that giving learners
membership queries in the PAC model does not help them for a large number of concepts being
learned if signature schemes exist. In this paper, we investigate whether the converse of this state-
ment can be proven, i.e. whether it can be shown that if making membership queries does not help
learners, then signature schemes exist. We look at severely weakened versions of the converse and
prove a couple of results. On the whole, however, our attempt at converting their result is largely
unsuccessful.
1.2 Outline
First, we will describe in detail the result of Angluin and Kharitonov. Their result provides much of
the foundation of the approach we take in this paper, and the intuition used in proving their result
is needed in proving our results as well. Some of the background and definitions used in this section
are also used in later sections.
Second, we give background material for the next section. Our results in the next section will
take the form (assumption about query removing) implies (cryptographic primitive with security
property), and it is in this section that we lay out all the assumptions and security properties and
compare them.
Third, we show our two original results along with one approach that did not work. The two results
are two different ways of weaking the converse into a provable statement. The one failed approach
is an attempt at a result stronger than the first two, and we explore exactly why it fails.
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Finally, we take a look at what has been accomplished and try to judge to what extent it has been
a success.
2 The Angluin and Kharitonov Result
In this section we give an overview of the Angluin and Kharitonov result. There are some com-
plicating details that are omitted, and the proof sketch at the end is meant to provide motivation
and intuition for our results and approaches that follow rather than to be a completely rigorous
statement of the proof provided in their paper. As a result, we slightly fudge some of the numbers
for increased clarity.
We make use of the following definition throughout this paper: a function f(·) is negligible in n if
for all polynomials p(·), there exists an N > 0 such that for all n > N , f(n) < 1p(n) . In other words,
f is very small.
2.1 PAC Learning
The Angluin and Kharitonov result is a statement about learning in Leslie Valiant’s Probably Ap-
proximately Correct (PAC) model. In broad terms, this model places the learner in a classification
scenario, meaning it must classify Boolean strings based on whether they have some property. This
property is represented as a concept c ⊆ {0, 1}n, which is identified with the Boolean indicator
function c : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, where c(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ x ∈ c. Letting Cn be a set of concepts on n
variables (i.e. c ∈ Cn), we define a concept class to be the set of all concepts C =
⋃
n≥1 Cn. Further-
more, there is some reasonable encoding of the concepts which gives a measurement size(c) of how
complex the concepts are. For example, the size of a 3CNF is the number of clauses it contains. It
is reasonable to allow the learner more time to run when learning more complex concepts.
The learning scenario is as follows: the learner L wants to learn some c : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. There is
some underlying probability distribution on Boolean strings D. The learner’s access to c is mediated
through an example oracle EX(c,D), which when called will return to L a tuple (x, c(x)), where x
is drawn from D. The learner may run in polynomial time, and when it has finished it outputs a
hypothesis h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. The error of this hypothesis is err(h) = Prx∼D[c(x) 6= h(x)]. There
are two error inputs 0 < ε, δ,< 1, and the expectation is that err(h) ≤ ε with success probability at
least 1− δ. Thus,
Definition 1. L PAC learns C if for any n ≥ 1, distribution D on n variables, concept c ∈ Cn,
and 0 < ε, δ,< 1, L, when given access to EX(c,D), outputs in time poly(n, size(c), ε−1, δ−1) a
hypothesis h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that with probability at least 1− δ, err(h) ≤ ε.
Additionally, we can consider the option of giving L the ability to make membership queries, in
which it is able to pose examples of its own as well as receiving them from the example oracle. Thus,
if L makes a membership query on x, it will receive c(x). If L learns C with membership queries,
we say that L PAC learns C with membership queries.
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2.2 Signature Schemes
Their result also makes use of cryptographic protocols called signature schemes. A signature scheme
is a tuple of algorithms SIGSCHEME = (GEN,SIGN, V ER) which obey certain properties.
GEN is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input n in unary and outputs
(PK,SK), the public and secret keys. SIGN is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm which
takes as input the two keys and the message m to be signed and outputs a signature s(m) of
that message of length p(n), for some polynomial p(·). V ER is a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm which takes as input the public key, a message m, and a potential signature s?(m), and
verifies whether s?(m) is a proper signature of m. V ER is required to give a positive verification
for any signature produced for a message by SIGN .
The signature scheme is required to satisfy certain properties to be considered secure, and these
properties differ based on the level and type of security expected of the signature scheme. An-
gluin and Kharitonov require that their signature schemes be secure against existential forgery.
The scenario is as follows: the forger F is given access to both the public key PK and a sign-
ing oracle SIGN ORACLE(·), which when called on m will return a proper signature of m, i.e.
SIGN(PK,SK,m). In other words, F is granted black box access to the signing algorithm, in ad-
dition to the public information it already has. When F is done running, it is expected to produce
a tuple (m, s?(m)), where m is a never-before-seen message and s?(m) is an attempted signature
forgery. The expectation is that if the signature scheme is secure at all, the probability that F
outputs a successful forgery is small. In other words,
Definition 2. SIGSCHEME is secure against existential forgery if for every forger F and for
sufficiently large n, when (PK,SK) is drawn from GEN(1n) and F is given access to PK and
SIGN ORACLE(·), the probability that F outputs a tuple (m, s?(m)), for m a never-before-seen
message, such that V ER(PK,m, s?(m)) = 1, is negligible in n.
2.3 Their Result
Their result works by taking as input a learning algorithm which uses membership queries and,
through the clever use of a signature scheme, producing a learning algorithm which works without
using membership queries. Obviously, this can’t work for all learning algorithms, or membership
queries would add no power to learners whatsoever. The key is that their membership query remover
works by embedding the signature scheme into the concept being learned. Thus, this will not work
for certain weaker concept classes which require an exponential increase in the size of their concepts
to embed the signature scheme. However, Angluin and Kharitonov stilla attempt to accomodate as
many concept classes as possible, and to do this they use of a peculiar object called a tableau. A
tableau is a complete transcript of the history of a computation on some input. Being given access
to tableaus can often simplify computations, thus allowing more concept classes to participate in the
query removal. Because V ER is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm, its tableaus are also of
polynomial length. So the size of the tableau is t(n), for some polynomial t(·). Let TAB(PK, x, y)
be the proper tableau for the verification algorithm V ER on input (PK, x, y).
The embedding works as follows: for any concept c ∈ C which takes as input strings x ∈ {0, 1}n,
there is a corresponding concept c′ also in C which takes as input tuples (x, y, z) from a larger
input space. For c′ to be a proper embedding of the signature scheme into c, any (x, y, z) for which
c′(x, y, z) = 1 must satisfy certain properties. First, c′ must correspond to c, so c(x) = 1. Second,
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y must be a proper signature of x. Third, z must be a proper tableau for the verification algorithm
V ER on (x, y). Thus, c′ combines both c and the signature scheme, and has some extra information
which helps to compute it. What we’re interested in is concept classes for which size(c′) is not too
much larger than size(c). This notion is captured in the following definition:
Definition 3. A concept class C is suitable for signature schemes if for every signature scheme
SIGSCHEME there is some polynomial q(·) such that for every integer n, for every c ∈ C over
n variables, and for every pair of keys (PK,SK) that GEN can output on the input 1n, there is a
c′ ∈ C such that size(c′) ≤ q(n) ∗ size(c) and c′(x, y, z) = 1 ⇐⇒ c(x) = 1, V ER(PK, x, y) = 1,
and z = TAB(PK, x, y).
An example of a concept class that us suitable for signature schemes is 3CNF . Angluin and
Kharitonov give a more general version of this embedding which works for a wider collection of
concept classes, but the embedding we give here is the foundation of theirs and is more appropriate
for what we are trying to accomplish in this section, i.e. to give intuition.
We now sketch out their result:
Theorem 1 (Angluin and Kharitonov). If signature schemes exist, any concept class suitable for
signature schemes is PAC learnable without membership queries if it is PAC learnable with member-
ship queries.
Proof (Sketch). Let C be a concept class suitable for signature schemes and let QL be an algorithm
which PAC learns it with membership queries. We will provide an algorithm that L which PAC
learns C without membership queries.
algorithm L = On input n, size(c), ε, and δ:
1. GEN(1n)→ (PK,SK)
2. Run QL(n+ p(n) + t(n), q(n) ∗ size(c), ε, δ). When it
3. (a) requests an example, draw an example (x, b) and give QL the tuple (x, y, z, b), where
y = SIGN(PK,SK, x) and z = TAB(PK, x, y). Save the tuple (x, b)
(b) makes a membership query on (x, y, z):
i. if y is a signature for x, z is the tableau of V ER on x and y, and an example of the
form (x, b) has been drawn before, answer b.
ii. otherwise, answer 0.
(c) outputs a hypothesis h′, output h, where h(x) = h′(x, y, z) for y = SIGN(PK,SK, x))
and z = TAB(PK, x, y).
Obviously, L runs without membership queries. What we must check now is that it preserves
the success characteristics of QL. Assume for a second that every membership query made by QL
is answered correctly. Then if c is the concept L is trying to learn, QL is being trained on the concept
c′ : {0, 1}n+p(n)+t(n) → {0, 1}, where c′(x, y, z) = 1 ⇐⇒ c(x) = 1, Pr[SIGN(PK,SK, x) = y)] 6= 0,
and z = TAB(PK, x, y). Furthermore, if D is the distribution L is trying to learn on, then QL
is being trained on the distribution D′, where D′(x, y, z) = D(x) · Pr[SIGN(PK,SK, x) = y)] if
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z = TAB(PK, x, y) and 0 otherwise. By the guarantee that QL is a valid learning algorithm, under
the assumption that its membership queries are answered correctly, the hypothesis h′ it produces
learns concept c′ on distribution D′ to an error of err(h′) < ε with probability at least 1− δ. This
gives us the following bound on the error of L with probability at least 1− δ (where used, z′ will be
an appropriate tableau):
err(h) = Prx∼D[c(x) 6= h(x)]
= Prx∼D[c(x) 6= h′(x, SIGN(PK,SK, x), z′)]
= Pr(x,y,z)∼D′ [c(x) 6= h′(x, SIGN(PK,SK, x)), z′]
= Pr(x,y,z)∼D′ [c′(x, y, z) 6= h′(x, SIGN(PK,SK, x)), z′]
= Pr(x,y,z)∼D′ [c′(x, y, z) 6= h′(x, y, z)]
= err(h′)
≤ ε
Now, the only thing remaining to be accounted for is the possibility that a membership query is
answered incorrectly. The only time in which this takes place is when QL queries an (x, y, z) such
that c(x) = 1, y is a proper signature for x, and z is the tableau of V ER on x and y, but no
example of the form (x, b) has ever been seen before. In this case, QL has produced, for an x it
hasn’t yet seen, a signature y such that V ER(PK, x, y) = 1. Since the signature scheme is secure
against existential forgery, the probability that this can occur is negligible in n, which does not add
significantly to the probability of failure, and thus we are done.
Angluin and Kharitonov give a more rigorous proof of this by proving the contrapositive, i.e. by
showing that if L did not learn properly without membership queries then it could be modified into
a forger which breaks the signature scheme’s security property.
This hints at the kind of approach we are going to take in proving our converses: their algorithm
has an example map x 7→ (x, SIGN(PK,SK, x), z). Our approach is to analyze algorithms which
use similar example maps and see if these example maps are necessarily some sort of cryptographic
primitive.
3 Preliminaries
Ideally, our result would be a complete converse of the Angluin and Kharitonov result, in other
words a result stating that if membership queries don’t matter for concepts suitable for signature
schemes, then signature schemes exist. What we have instead are results that are weaker forms of
this statement. All of our results begin by assuming the existence of a process which takes a learner
that uses membership queries and then produces one that doesn’t. Furthermore, we assume that
this process looks like the one used in the Angluin and Kharitonov paper. More formally, we posit
the existence of a query remover QREM = (GEN,EM) which obeys certain properties. GEN
is a randomized polynomial-time algorithm which takes as input n in unary and outputs a key. The
example map EM is a polynomial-time algorithm which takes a key and a string of length n and
outputs another string of length p(n), for p(·) some polynomial.
We want to use our query remover to help learn concept classes, but, as above, not all concept classes
are powerful enough to support query removers. A concept class C is suitable for QREM if there
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is some polynomial q(·) such that for every integer n, for every c ∈ C over n variables, and for every
key k that GEN can output on the input 1n, there is a c′ ∈ C such that size(c′) ≤ q(n)∗size(c) and
c′(x, y) = 1 ⇐⇒ c(x) = 1 and EMk(x) = y. For the sake of clarity, we have suppressed references
to tableaus in this and the following sections, but they could be restored with little change to what
follows.
Now we can define the query removal properties that we expect QREM to possess. Let C be a
concept class suitable for QREM , let QL be a membership query algorithm, and let p(·) and q(·)
be the polynomials described above. Consider the following algorithm LQREM (QL):
algorithm LQREM (QL) = On input n, size(c), ε, and δ:
1. GEN(1n)→ k
2. Run QL(n+ p(n), q(n) ∗ size(c), ε2 ,
δ
2 ). When it
3. (a) requests an example, draw an example (x, b) and give QL ((x,EMk(x)), b).
(b) makes a query for an (x, s) which has not been seen before as an example request, answer
0.
(c) makes a query for an (x, s) which has been seen before as an example request, answer
what was answered before.
(d) outputs a hypothesis h, output h′, where h′(x) = h(x,EMk(x)).
If QREM is to earn its name as a query remover, the transformation from QL to LQREM (QL) must
not only get rid of queries (which it obviously does), it must also preserve the success characteristics
of QL. In other words, we ask that the following be satisfied.
Assumption 1. If QL PAC-learns C with membership queries, then LQREM (QL) PAC-learns C
(without membership queries).
This is the main assumption we will be dealing with, but sometimes we will make use of the following
stronger assumption.
Assumption 2. If QL PAC-learns C with membership queries, then the probability that LQREM (QL)
answers a membership query from QL incorrectly is negligible in n.
If QREM satisfies Assumption 2 then it also satisfies Assumption 1, because if LQREM (QL) an-
swers queries correctly an overwhelming amount of the time, then QL is almost always simulated
properly, so it will almost always output a correct hypothesis. However, what is not clear is whether
Assumption 1 implies Assumption 2.
There is one more assumption which will be of use. In this assumption, we will be shifting our
attention to Angluin’s exact learning model, and so we will need to perform a slight adjustment to
LQREM (QL). But first, we will define the model.
In Angluin’s exact learning model, the learner has access to equivalence queries EQ instead of the
example oracle from the PAC setting. For an equivalence query, the learner submits a hypothesis h,
and EQ(h) tests whether h = c. If not, the query returns a counterexample x for which h(x) 6= c(x).
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The expectation is that the learner in polynomial time arrives at an equivalence query for which its
hypothesis is equivalent to c. If this is always the case, then the learner exactly learns C.
So, we now perform the necessary adjustment of LQREM (QL).
algorithm L′QREM (QL) = On input n, size(c), and δ:
1. GEN(1n)→ k
2. Run QL(n+ p(n), q(n) ∗ size(c), δ2 ). When it
3. (a) performs an equivalence query on a hypothesis h, perform an equivalence query on hy-
pothesis h′, where h′(x) = h(x,EMk(x)). If a counterexample (x, b) is returned, give QL
((x,EMk(x)), b).
(b) makes a query for an (x, s(x)) which has not been seen before as an example request,
answer 0.
(c) makes a query for an (x, s(x)) which has been seen before as an example request, answer
what was answered before.
(d) outputs a hypothesis h, output h′, where h′(x) = h(x,EMk(x)).
This is identical to LQREM (QL), except it accounts for the fact that in the exact learning model,
equivalence queries, not example oracle requests, are made. This is needed for the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 3. If QL exactly learns C with membership queries, then L′QREM (QL) exactly learns
C (without membership queries).
Now that we have some hardness assumptions in place, it is natural to use these to define cryp-
tographic tools. In this case, we will be transforming query removers into message authentication
schemes (MACs). Given a query remover QREM = (GEN,EM), we define its corresponding MAC
as:
Definition 4. MAC(QREM) = (GEN,SIGN, V ER) is the MAC whose calls are handled as:
1. SIGNk(x) = EMk(x)
2. V ERk(x, s) =
{
1 if EMk(x) = s
0 o.w.
Ideally, we would like this MAC(QREM) to satisfy the following security property.
Security Property 1. For any forger F , for any distribution D over {0, 1}n, when k is generated
by GEN(1n) and F is fed examples of the form (x, SIGNk(x)), where the x’s are drawn from D,
the probability that F outputs a new pair (y, s?(y)) such that V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1 is negligible in n.
A second, weaker, notion of security which we will also use is the following.
Security Property 2. There is no forger F which, when given a polynomial number of distinct
(x, SIGNk(x)) pairs, always outputs a new pair (y, s?(y)) such that V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1.
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Notice that this security property is entirely distribution-free, which suggests that it will be used in
concert with Assumption 3, the exact learning assumption.
4 Results
Here we present two results that give partial converses to the Angluin and Kharitonov result. Then,
we give a possible approach for a stronger converse, and explain why it fails.
4.1 The First Proof
Ideally, we would like a proof showing that if QREM satisfies Assumption 1, then MAC(QREM)
satisfies Security Property 1. We don’t have this, but in lieu of this result we do have the following.
Theorem 2. If QREM satisfies Assumption 2, then MAC(QREM) satisfies Security Property 1.
Proof. We will show this by proving the contrapositive. Assume that MAC(QREM) does not satisfy
Security Property 1. Then there exists a forger F and a distribution D over {0, 1}n such that when
k is generated by GEN(1n) and F is fed examples of the form (x, SIGNk(x)), where the x’s are
drawn from D, the probability that F outputs a new pair (y, s?(y)) such that V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1
is nonnegligible. Now we will use this to construct a query learner which poses membership queries
which LQREM (QL) is forced to get wrong.
Let C be a concept class which is PAC-learnable with membership queries, is suitable for QREM ,
and contains the all-1’s concept. Let QL be an algorithm which PAC-learns C with membership
queries. Consider the following algorithm QL′.
algorithm QL′ = On input n, size(c), ε, and δ:
1. Run QL(n, size(c), ε, δ) until it outputs a hypothesis h.
2. Run F concurrently with QL, giving it samples drawn from the example oracle (first, the
samples drawn while running QL, and then independently drawn samples if it requests more).
When F outputs a new example, do a membership query on it. (Disregard the result.)
3. Output h.
QL′ is a valid PAC learner for C with membership queries because it outputs hypotheses in a manner
identical to QL. However, it can be used to make QREM violate Assumption 2.
If we use LQREM (QL′) to attempt to learn the all-1’s concept on the distribution D, then when
QL′ is run as a subroutine it will in turn run F , providing it with (x,EMk(x)) pairs, where the
x’s are drawn from D. With nonnegligible probability F will output a new pair (y, s?(y)) in which
V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1. By definition, EMk(x) = SIGNk(x) and V ERk(x, s) = 1 ⇐⇒ EMk(x) = s,
so EMk(y) = s?(y). This means that a membership query on (y, s?(y)) should return 1, because
LQREM (QL′) is learning the all-1’s function. However, this is a new pair, and LQREM (QL′) answers
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any membership query it hasn’t seen before with a 0. So with nonnegligible probability a membership
query is answered incorrectly, violating Assumption 2.
Theorem 1 is somewhat unsatisfying, as algorithm QL′ acts essentially identically regardless of
whether it is fed an incorrect query. In other words, it causes the query remover to err, but in a
relatively benign way. What we would like is a learning algorithm which, while otherwise behaving
well, can detect itself being sent through the query remover, in which case it acts eccentrically. (All
of this, of course, assumes we have a working forger.)
4.2 The Second Proof
A possible way to do this is to make a membership query on an example and compare the answer of
that query to the answer given by the hypothesis produced by QL on line 1 of the algorithm QL′.
Because QL produces highly accurate hypotheses, this membership query test should detect when
the query is being answered incorrectly. All that is needed is a membership query which is known to
be answered incorrectly, which in Theorem 1 we have seen how to construct. We shift our attention
to the exact learning model for this proof.
Theorem 3. If QREM satisfies Assumption 3, then MAC(QREM) satisfies Security Property 2.
Proof. We will show this by proving the contrapositive. Assume that MAC(QREM) does not satisfy
Security Property 2. Then there exists a polynomial r(·) and a forger F which, when given r(n)
distinct (x, SIGNk(x)) pairs, always outputs a new pair (y, s?(y)) such that V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1.
Now we will use this to construct a query learner which poses membership queries which LQREM (QL)
is forced to get wrong.
Let C be a concept class which is exactly learnable with membership queries, is suitable for QREM ,
and contains the all-1’s concept. Let QL be an algorithm which exactly learns C with membership
queries. Consider the following algorithm QL′.
algorithm QL′ = On input n and size(c):
1. Generate r(n) distinct examples using equivalence queries and feed them to F . If it outputs a
new example y, perform a membership query on y and save the answer as b.
2. Run QL(n, size(c)) until it outputs a hypothesis h.
3. Output the hypothesis h′, where h′(x) =
{
b if x = y
h(x) o.w.
QL′ is a valid exact learner with membership queries for concept class C, but when attempting to
learn the all-1’s concept L′QREM (QL
′) will never work. This is because F is guaranteed to always
generate a correct forgery, and when the membership query on this forgery is performed, the response
will always be 0. Because we are learning the all-1’s concept, it should be 1. This error is carried
over into the final hypothesis, and thus the final hypothesis is error-prone. So QREM does not
satisfy Assumption 3.
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This gives us a result in the right direction, and poses the question of whether the shift to the exact
learning model was necessary.
4.3 The Third Proof
Ideally, we’d like to prove the following statement:
Theorem 4. (incorrect) If QREM satisfies Assumption 1, then MAC(QREM) satisfies Security
Property 1.
And a proof of this statement might go as follows:
Proof. (incorrect)We will show this by proving the contrapositive. Assume that MAC(QREM)
does not satisfy Security Property 1. Then there exists a forger F and a distribution D over {0, 1}n
such that when k is generated by GEN(1n) and F is fed examples of the form (x, SIGNk(x)),
where the x’s are drawn from D, the probability that F outputs a new pair (y, s?(y)) such that
V ERk(y, s?(y)) = 1 is nonnegligible. Now we will use this to construct a query learner which poses
membership queries which LQREM (QL) is forced to get wrong.
Let C be a concept class which is PAC-learnable with membership queries, is suitable for QREM ,
and contains the all-1’s concept. Let QL be an algorithm which PAC-learns C with membership
queries. Consider the following algorithm QL′.
algorithm QL′ = On input n, size(c), ε, and δ:
1. min(ε, δ)→ ε′
2. Run QL(n, size(c), ε′, 1− 1−δ1−ε′ ) until it outputs a hypothesis h.
3. Run F concurrently with QL, giving it samples drawn from the example oracle (first, the
samples drawn while running QL, and then independently drawn samples if it requests more).
When F outputs a new example (x, s?(x)), do a membership query on it. Save the result as
bit b.
4. Evaluate h(x, s?(x)). If it equals b, output h. Otherwise, output the all-0’s hypothesis.
As before, QL′ is a valid PAC learner for C with membership queries. This is because with proba-
bility 1 − (1 − 1−δ1−ε′ ) =
1−δ
1−ε′ , h misclassifies an example drawn from D with probability at most ε
′.
So it will correctly evaluate the forgery produced by F with probability 1 − ε′, meaning that with
probability at least (1− (1− 1−δ1−ε′ ))(1− ε
′) = 1−δ1−ε′ (1− ε
′) = 1− δ, QL′ will output an h with error
ε′, which is at most ε.
Now, we will show how this makes QREM violate Assumption 1. If we use LQREM (QL′) to attempt
to learn the all-1’s concept on the distribution D, then when QL′ is run as a subroutine it will in turn
run F , which will produce a valid forgery that should be evaluated to 1. Because h is 1− ε accurate
it will with high probability properly evaluate this forgery correctly. However, when the membership
query is performed it will almost always be a 0, so QL′ will output the all-0’s hypothesis. Since
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LQREM (QL′) is learning the all-1’s hypothesis, the hypothesis QL′ outputs is 100% wrong, meaning
that the query removal process has failed. Thus, LQREM (QL′) violates Assumption 1.
There are many things wrong with this proof, most of which stem from the fact that our forger F
does not output forgeries distributed according to D. In fact, it does not even output forgeries which
are restricted to the support of D. This is problematic as QL is guaranteed to output hypotheses
which are highly accurate only with respect to D. So long as F outputs forgeries from a distribution
which is not D, there are no guarantees that h performs well, and thus h is of no use as a means
of checking whether the membership queries are being answered correctly. This means QL′ is not
even necessarily a valid PAC learner for C with membership queries, and so rigging LQREM (QL′)
to fail gives us nothing.
5 Conclusion
Our first work with the Angluin and Kharitonov paper was to try to see whether any other assump-
tions (rather than signature schemes) would imply that queries could be removed. This proved to
be difficult, however, and it eventually seemed as though signature schemes were exactly what was
needed to perform query removal. We took a stab at trying to formalize this, and this paper is the
consequence.
Our results are a mixed bag: to get strong security properties we need a very strong assumption.
On the other hand, a weakening of the assumption yields a severely crippled cryptographic protocol.
And our attempt at finding a happy medium encounters some fundamental problems. On the whole,
this appears to be a difficult problem to grapple with.
Membership queries are still providing fruitful avenues of research. The membership query results
mentioned in the introduction regarding the agnostic learning model are only two years old, and
one of the results left room for improvement. This paper leaves open some substantial room for
improvement of its own as well.
Cryptography and learning theory have been joined at the hip for quite some time, and new results
linking the two are ever forthcoming. This paper provides yet another link between the two, applying
learning theoretic tools to build a foundation for cryptography.
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